Research articles for the 2019-05-25
Do Long-term Institutional Investors Promote Corporate Social Responsibility Activities?
SSRN
This paper examines how the investment horizons of a firm's institutional investors affect its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Using data on U.S. firms’ CSR ratings over the 1995â€"2012 period, we find that longer investment horizons are positively related to CSR. Further, active long-term institutions increase CSR whereas passive long-term institutions have no significant effect. Our results suggest that investors with long-term horizons have more incentives to monitor their firms which leads managers to engage in more vigorous CSR activities.
SSRN
This paper examines how the investment horizons of a firm's institutional investors affect its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Using data on U.S. firms’ CSR ratings over the 1995â€"2012 period, we find that longer investment horizons are positively related to CSR. Further, active long-term institutions increase CSR whereas passive long-term institutions have no significant effect. Our results suggest that investors with long-term horizons have more incentives to monitor their firms which leads managers to engage in more vigorous CSR activities.
Peer Effects and Risk Sharing in Experimental Asset Markets
SSRN
We investigate the effect of introducing information about peer portfolios in an experimental Arrow-Debreu economy. Confirming the prediction of a general equilibrium model with inequality averse preferences, we find that peer information leads to reduced variation in payoffs within peer groups. Information also improves risk sharing, as the data suggests that experiencing earnings deviations from peers induces a shift to more balanced portfolios. In a treatment where we highlight the highest earner, we observe a reduction in risk sharing, while highlighting the lowest earner has no effects compared to providing neutral information. Our results indicate that the presence of social information and its framing is an important determinant of equilibrium in financial markets.
SSRN
We investigate the effect of introducing information about peer portfolios in an experimental Arrow-Debreu economy. Confirming the prediction of a general equilibrium model with inequality averse preferences, we find that peer information leads to reduced variation in payoffs within peer groups. Information also improves risk sharing, as the data suggests that experiencing earnings deviations from peers induces a shift to more balanced portfolios. In a treatment where we highlight the highest earner, we observe a reduction in risk sharing, while highlighting the lowest earner has no effects compared to providing neutral information. Our results indicate that the presence of social information and its framing is an important determinant of equilibrium in financial markets.
Stay Concentrated to Survive
SSRN
Using a text-based measure as proxy for a firm’s geographically dispersed business interests, we document that geographic dispersion increases the probability of failure risk for newly listed firms. We find that the effect is more pronounced in a soft information environment where information is not easily transferrable or verifiable over long distances, and in small communities where managerial social concerns dominate in decision-making. Moreover, we find that firms with spatially distributed business interests are negatively associated with post-IPO operating performance. Overall, the results are consistent with the argument that geographically dispersed firms are subject to internal information asymmetry and divert managerial focus away from shareholder value, which negatively affects corporate performance and eventually results in corporate failure.
SSRN
Using a text-based measure as proxy for a firm’s geographically dispersed business interests, we document that geographic dispersion increases the probability of failure risk for newly listed firms. We find that the effect is more pronounced in a soft information environment where information is not easily transferrable or verifiable over long distances, and in small communities where managerial social concerns dominate in decision-making. Moreover, we find that firms with spatially distributed business interests are negatively associated with post-IPO operating performance. Overall, the results are consistent with the argument that geographically dispersed firms are subject to internal information asymmetry and divert managerial focus away from shareholder value, which negatively affects corporate performance and eventually results in corporate failure.
