Optimal trading strategies for pairs trading have been studied by models that try to find either optimal shares of stocks by assuming no transaction costs or optimal timing of trading fixed numbers of shares of stocks with transaction costs. To find optimal strategies which determine optimally both trade times and number of shares in pairs trading process, we use a singular stochastic control approach to study an optimal pairs trading problem with proportional transaction costs. Assuming a cointegrated relationship for a pair of stock log-prices, we consider a portfolio optimization problem which involves dynamic trading strategies with proportional transaction costs. We show that the value function of the control problem is the unique viscosity solution of a nonlinear quasi-variational inequality, which is equivalent to a free boundary problem for the singular stochastic control value function. We then develop a discrete time dynamic programming algorithm to compute the transaction regions, and show the convergence of the discretization scheme. We illustrate our approach with numerical examples and discuss the impact of different parameters on transaction regions. We study the out-of-sample performance in an empirical study that consists of six pairs of U.S. stocks selected from different industry sectors, and demonstrate the efficiency of the optimal strategy.

Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for bids in the current auction as well as for the future auctions, which highlights the necessity of good bidding strategies. In this paper, we perform an equilibrium analysis of single unit single-shot double auctions with a certain clearing price and payment rule, which we refer to as ACPR, and find it intractable to analyze as number of participating agents increase. We further derive the best response for a bidder with complete information in a single-shot double auction with ACPR. Leveraging the theory developed for single-shot double auction and taking the PowerTAC wholesale market PDA as our testbed, we proceed by modeling the PDA of PowerTAC as an MDP. We propose a novel bidding strategy, namely MDPLCPBS. We empirically show that MDPLCPBS follows the equilibrium strategy for double auctions that we previously analyze. In addition, we benchmark our strategy against the baseline and the state-of-the-art bidding strategies for the PowerTAC wholesale market PDAs, and show that MDPLCPBS outperforms most of them consistently.

The recent emergence of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum has posed possible alternatives to global payments as well as financial assets around the globe, making investors and financial regulators aware of the importance of modeling them correctly. The Levy's stable distribution is one of the attractive distributions that well describes the fat tails and scaling phenomena in economic systems. In this paper, we show that the behaviors of price fluctuations in emerging cryptocurrency markets can be characterized by a non-Gaussian Levy's stable distribution with $\alpha \simeq 1.4$ under certain conditions on time intervals ranging roughly from 30 minutes to 4 hours. Our arguments are developed under quantitative valuation defined as a distance function using the Parseval's relation in addition to the theoretical background of the General Central Limit Theorem (GCLT). We also discuss the fit with the Levy's stable distribution compared to the fit with other distributions by employing the method based on likelihood ratios. Our approach can be extended for further analysis of statistical properties and contribute to developing proper applications for financial modeling.

We study the optimal management of a collectivised pension fund, where all investors agree that the assets of deceased members are shared among the survivors. We find that for realistic parameters based on the UK pensions market, a collectivised fund achieves an approximately 20% better return than either an annuity or a personal investment fund.

We introduce models of investor preferences over a stream of pension payments in the presence of mortality, incorporating a new concept of adequacy. We find that for risk-averse individuals, pension adequacy plays an important role in determining the optimal fund management strategy.

A key issue in the design of collective funds is how to ensure the fund treats all investors fairly. This is a trivial problem in the case that all investors have identical preferences, wealth and mortality, but becomes challenging for heterogeneous funds. We give a strategy for the management of heterogeneous funds in complete markets and prove that it is asymptotically optimal in the absence of systematic longevity risk.

In a collectivised pension fund, investors agree that any money remaining in the fund when they die can be shared among the survivors.

We give a numerical algorithm to compute the optimal investment-consumption strategy for an infinite collective of identical investors with exponential Kihlstrom--Mirman preferences, investing in the Black--Scholes market in continuous time but consuming in discrete time. Our algorithm can also be applied to an individual investor.

We derive an analytic formula for the optimal consumption in the special case of an individual who chooses not to invest in the financial markets. We prove that our problem formulation for a fund with an infinite number of members is a good approximation to a fund with a large, but finite number of members.

We apply the procedure of Lee et al. to the problem of performing inference on the signal noise ratio of the asset which displays maximum sample Sharpe ratio over a set of possibly correlated assets. We find a multivariate analogue of the commonly used approximate standard error of the Sharpe ratio to use in this conditional estimation procedure. We also consider the simple Bonferroni correction for multiple hypothesis testing, fixing it for the case of positive common correlation among assets, and a chi-bar square test against one-sided alternatives.

Testing indicates the conditional inference procedure achieves nominal type I rate, and does not appear to suffer from non-normality of returns. The conditional estimation test has low power under the alternative where there is little spread in the signal noise ratios of the assets, and high power under the alternative where a single asset has high signal noise ratio.

In this paper we introduce a new technique based on high-dimensional Chebyshev Tensors that we call \emph{Orthogonal Chebyshev Sliding Technique}. We implemented this technique inside the systems of a tier-one bank, and used it to approximate Front Office pricing functions in order to reduce the substantial computational burden associated with the capital calculation as specified by FRTB IMA. In all cases, the computational burden reductions obtained were of more than $90\%$, while keeping high degrees of accuracy, the latter obtained as a result of the mathematical properties enjoyed by Chebyshev Tensors.

Firm financials are well established as return predictors, being the inspiration for a large set of anomalies in the asset pricing literature. Employing topological data analysis we revisit the question of association between seven of the most commonly studied financial ratios and stock returns. Specifically the TDA Ball Mapper algorithm is applied to visualise the point cloud of financial ratios as an abstract two-dimensional graph readily allowing for identification of interdependencies between factors. These relationships are seldom monotonic, opportunities for investors to profitably exploit this knowledge provided by TDA abound. Clear potential offered by the tools of TDA to shed new light on asset pricing models is demonstrated. Scope for benefit is limited only by the availability of information to the analyst.

Omega ratio, defined as the probability-weighted ratio of gains over losses at a given level of expected return, has been advocated as a better performance indicator compared to Sharpe and Sortino ratio as it depends on the full return distribution and hence encapsulates all information about risk and return. We compute Omega ratio for the normal distribution and show that under some distribution symmetry assumptions, the Omega ratio is oversold as it does not provide any additional information compared to Sharpe ratio. Indeed, for returns that have elliptic distributions, we prove that the optimal portfolio according to Omega ratio is the same as the optimal portfolio according to Sharpe ratio. As elliptic distributions are a weak form of symmetric distributions that generalized Gaussian distributions and encompass many fat tail distributions, this reduces tremendously the potential interest for the Omega ratio.

Stochastic bridges are commonly used to impute missing data with a lower sampling rate to generate data with a higher sampling rate, while preserving key properties of the dynamics involved in an unbiased way. While the generation of Brownian bridges and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck bridges is well understood, unbiased generation of such stochastic bridges subject to a given extremum has been less explored in the literature. After a review of known results, we compare two algorithms for generating Brownian bridges constrained to a given extremum, one of which generalises to other diffusions. We further apply this to generate unbiased Ornstein-Uhlenbeck bridges and unconstrained processes, both constrained to a given extremum, along with more tractable numerical approximations of these algorithms. Finally, we consider the case of drift, and applications to geometric Brownian motions.

Node centrality is one of the most important and widely used concepts in the study of complex networks. Here, we extend the paradigm of node centrality in financial and economic networks to consider the changes of node "importance" produced not only by the variation of the topology of the system but also as a consequence of the external levels of risk to which the network as a whole is submitted. Starting from the "Susceptible-Infected" (SI) model of epidemics and its relation to the communicability functions of networks we develop a series of risk-dependent centralities for nodes in (financial and economic) networks. We analyze here some of the most important mathematical properties of these risk-dependent centrality measures. In particular, we study the newly observed phenomenon of ranking interlacement, by means of which two entities may interlace their ranking positions in terms of risk in the network as a consequence of the change in the external conditions only, i.e., without any change in the topology. We test the risk-dependent centralities by studying two real-world systems: the network generated by collecting assets of the S\&P 100 and the corporate board network of the US top companies, according to Forbes in 1999. We found that a high position in the ranking of the analyzed financial companies according to their risk-dependent centrality corresponds to companies more sensitive to the external market variations during the periods of crisis.

Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test for these classic results by studying the ubiquitous dynamics, Multiplicative Weights Update, in different classes of congestion games, uncovering intricate non-equilibrium phenomena. As the system demand increases, the learning dynamics go through period-doubling bifurcations, leading to instabilities, chaos and large inefficiencies even in the simplest case of non-atomic routing games with two paths of linear cost where the Price of Anarchy is equal to one.

Starting with this simple class, we show that every system has a carrying capacity, above which it becomes unstable. If the equilibrium flow is a symmetric $50-50\%$ split, the system exhibits one period-doubling bifurcation. A single periodic attractor of period two replaces the attracting fixed point. Although the Price of Anarchy is equal to one, in the large population limit the time-average social cost for all but a zero measure set of initial conditions converges to its worst possible value. For asymmetric equilibrium flows, increasing the demand eventually forces the system into Li-Yorke chaos with positive topological entropy and periodic orbits of all possible periods. Remarkably, in all non-equilibrating regimes, the time-average flows on the paths converge exactly to the equilibrium flows, a property akin to no-regret learning in zero-sum games. These results are robust. We extend them to routing games with arbitrarily many strategies, polynomial cost functions, non-atomic as well as atomic routing games and heteregenous users. Our results are also applicable to any sequence of shrinking learning rates, e.g., $1/\sqrt{T}$, by allowing for a dynamically increasing population size.

We introduce an asymptotic small noise expansion, a so called vol-of-vol expansion, for potentially infinite dimensional and rough stochastic volatility models. Thereby we extend the scope of existing results for finite dimensional models and validate claims for infinite dimensional models. Furthermore we provide new, explicit (in the sense of non-recursive) representations of the so-called push-down Malliavin weights that utilizes a precise understanding of the terms of this expansion.

Planning and execution of clinical research and publication of results should conform to the highest ethical standards, given that human lives are at stake. However, economic incentives can generate conflicts of interest for investigators, who may be inclined to withhold unfavorable results or even tamper with the data. Analyzing p-values reported to the ClinicalTrials.gov registry with two different methodologies, we find suspicious patterns only for results from trials conducted by smaller industry sponsors, with presumably less reputation at stake. First, a density discontinuity test reveals an upward jump at the classical threshold for statistical significance for phase III results by small industry sponsors, suggesting some selective reporting. Second, we find an excess mass of significant results in phase III compared to phase II. However, once we link trials across phases, we can explain almost completely this excess mass for large industry sponsors by accounting for the incentives to selectively continue from phase II to phase III. In contrast, for trials sponsored by small pharmaceutical companies, selective continuation of trials economizing on research costs only explains less than one third of the increase in the share of significant results from phase II to phase III.