We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable mathematical properties with the most prominent being bounded efficiency loss and price markup under strategic interactions. Our model incorporates production capacity constraints and minimum inelastic demand requirements. Under perfect competition, the market mechanism yields allocations that maximize social welfare. When market participants are price-anticipating, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and provide an efficient way to compute the resulting market allocation. Moreover, we explicitly characterize the bounds on the welfare loss and prices observed at the Nash equilibrium.

Our study aims at quantifying the impact of climate change on corn farming in Ontario under several warming scenarios at the 2068 horizon. It is articulated around a discrete-time dynamic model of corn farm income with an annual time-step, corresponding to one agricultural cycle from planting to harvest. At each period, we compute the income given the corn yield, which is highly dependent on weather variables. We also provide a reproducible forecast of the yearly distribution of corn yield for 10 cities in Ontario. The price of corn futures at harvest time is taken into account and we fit our model by using 49 years of historical data. We then conduct out-of-sample Monte-Carlo simulations to obtain the farm income forecasts under a given climate change scenario.

We find economically and statistically significant gains from using machine learning to dynamically allocate between the market index and the risk-free asset. We model the market price of risk to determine the optimal weights in the portfolio: reward-risk market timing. This involves forecasting the direction of next month's excess return, which gives the reward, and constructing a dynamic volatility estimator that is optimized with a machine learning model, which gives the risk. Reward-risk timing with machine learning provides substantial improvements in investor utility, alphas, Sharpe ratios, and maximum drawdowns, after accounting for transaction costs, leverage constraints, and on a new out-of-sample test set. This paper provides a unifying framework for machine learning applied to both return- and volatility-timing.

We design three continuous--time models in finite horizon of a commodity price, whose dynamics can be affected by the actions of a representative risk--neutral producer and a representative risk--neutral trader. Depending on the model, the producer can control the drift and/or the volatility of the price whereas the trader can at most affect the volatility. The producer can affect the volatility in two ways: either by randomizing her production rate or, as the trader, using other means such as spreading false information. Moreover, the producer contracts at time zero a fixed position in a European convex derivative with the trader. The trader can be price-taker, as in the first two models, or she can also affect the volatility of the commodity price, as in the third model. We solve all three models semi--explicitly and give closed--form expressions of the derivative price over a small time horizon, preventing arbitrage opportunities to arise. We find that when the trader is price-taker, the producer can always compensate the loss in expected production profit generated by an increase of volatility by a gain in the derivative position by driving the price at maturity to a suitable level. Finally, in case the trader is active, the model takes the form of a nonzero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential game and we find that when the production rate is already at its optimal stationary level, there is an amount of derivative position that makes both players better off when entering the game.

Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) of the climate and economy aim to analyze the impact and efficacy of policies that aim to control climate change, such as carbon taxes and subsidies. A major characteristic of IAMs is that their geophysical sector determines the mean surface temperature increase over the preindustrial level, which in turn determines the damage function. Most of the existing IAMs are perfect-foresight forward-looking models, assuming that we know all of the future information. However, there are significant uncertainties in the climate and economic system, including parameter uncertainty, model uncertainty, climate tipping risks, economic risks, and ambiguity. For example, climate damages are uncertain: some researchers assume that climate damages are proportional to instantaneous output, while others assume that climate damages have a more persistent impact on economic growth. Climate tipping risks represent (nearly) irreversible climate events that may lead to significant changes in the climate system, such as the Greenland ice sheet collapse, while the conditions, probability of tipping, duration, and associated damage are also uncertain. Technological progress in carbon capture and storage, adaptation, renewable energy, and energy efficiency are uncertain too. In the face of these uncertainties, policymakers have to provide a decision that considers important factors such as risk aversion, inequality aversion, and sustainability of the economy and ecosystem. Solving this problem may require richer and more realistic models than standard IAMs, and advanced computational methods. The recent literature has shown that these uncertainties can be incorporated into IAMs and may change optimal climate policies significantly.