Research articles for the 2020-12-12
Botnet Monitoring Mechanisms on Peer-to-Peer (P2p) Botnet
SSRN
Internet security is getting less secure because of the existing of botnet threats. An attack plan can only be planned out to take down the botnet after the monitoring activities to understand the behavior of a botnet. Nowadays, the architecture of the botnet is developed using Peer-to-Peer (P2P) connection causing it to be harder to be monitored and track down. This paper is mainly about existing botnet monitoring tools. The purpose of this paper is to study the ways to monitor a botnet and how monitoring mechanism works. The monitoring tools are categorized into active and passive mechanism. A crawler is an active mechanism while sensor and Honeypot are the passive mechanisms. Previous work about each mechanism is present in this paper as well.
SSRN
Internet security is getting less secure because of the existing of botnet threats. An attack plan can only be planned out to take down the botnet after the monitoring activities to understand the behavior of a botnet. Nowadays, the architecture of the botnet is developed using Peer-to-Peer (P2P) connection causing it to be harder to be monitored and track down. This paper is mainly about existing botnet monitoring tools. The purpose of this paper is to study the ways to monitor a botnet and how monitoring mechanism works. The monitoring tools are categorized into active and passive mechanism. A crawler is an active mechanism while sensor and Honeypot are the passive mechanisms. Previous work about each mechanism is present in this paper as well.
Debt Maturity and the Threat of Human Capital Departure รข€" Evidence from CEOs near Retirement Age
SSRN
Employees are free to leave a firm. The mere threat of losing human capital should affect firms' debt financing as Hart and Moore (1994) argue. However, little empirical evidence exists. I uncover such evidence by studying how loans change as CEOs approach retirement age. I find that loan maturities shorten substantially when CEOs are near mandatory or customary retirement age, as well as near their instrumented or actual retirement. Among loans within the same firm-year, maturities decline by more if lenders are overall more averse to new CEOs, or if lenders perceive a larger increase in uncertainty about CEOs. Comparing loans within the same firm-year controls for observable and unobservable factors related to firms or CEOs, and suggests that lenders drive the shortening of loan maturities. Moreover, if the CFO is also departing, loan maturities decline by more. If the retired CEO stays in another role or an internal successor is identified, loan maturities do not decrease. Overall, results suggest that loan maturities shorten because lenders change the menu of loan contracts in response to the threat of firms losing key human capital.
SSRN
Employees are free to leave a firm. The mere threat of losing human capital should affect firms' debt financing as Hart and Moore (1994) argue. However, little empirical evidence exists. I uncover such evidence by studying how loans change as CEOs approach retirement age. I find that loan maturities shorten substantially when CEOs are near mandatory or customary retirement age, as well as near their instrumented or actual retirement. Among loans within the same firm-year, maturities decline by more if lenders are overall more averse to new CEOs, or if lenders perceive a larger increase in uncertainty about CEOs. Comparing loans within the same firm-year controls for observable and unobservable factors related to firms or CEOs, and suggests that lenders drive the shortening of loan maturities. Moreover, if the CFO is also departing, loan maturities decline by more. If the retired CEO stays in another role or an internal successor is identified, loan maturities do not decrease. Overall, results suggest that loan maturities shorten because lenders change the menu of loan contracts in response to the threat of firms losing key human capital.
