The use of multiple hypothesis testing adjustments varies widely in applied economic research, without consensus on when and how it should be done. We provide a game-theoretic foundation for this practice. Adjustments are often appropriate in our model when research influences multiple policy decisions. While control of classical notions of compound error rates can emerge in special cases, the appropriate adjustments generally depend on the nature of scale economies in the research production function and on economic interactions between policy decisions. When research examines multiple outcomes this motivates their aggregation into sufficient statistics for policy-making rather than multiple testing adjustments.

We introduce a new system of stochastic differential equations which models dependence of market beta and unsystematic risk upon size, measured by market capitalization. We fit our model using size deciles data from Kenneth French's data library. This model is somewhat similar to generalized volatility-stabilized models in (Pal, 2011; Pickova, 2013). The novelty of our work is twofold. First, we take into account the difference between price and total returns (in other words, between market size and wealth processes). Second, we work with actual market data. We study the long-term properties of this system of equations, and reproduce observed linearity of the capital distribution curve. Our model has two modifications: for price returns and for equity premium. Somewhat surprisingly, they exhibit the same fit, with very similar coefficients. In the Appendix, we analyze size-based real-world index funds.

We analyze characteristics' joint predictive information through the lens of out-of-sample power utility functions. Linking weights to characteristics to form optimal portfolios suffers from estimation error which we mitigate by maximizing an in-sample loss function that is more concave than the utility function. While no single characteristic can be used to enhance utility by all investors, conditioning on momentum, size, and residual volatility produces portfolios with significantly higher certainty equivalents than benchmarks for all investors. Characteristic complementarities produce the benefits, for example momentum mitigates overfitting inherent in other characteristics. Optimal portfolios' returns lie largely outside the span of traditional factors.

The purpose of this study is to measure the benefits and costs of using biochar, a carbon sequestration technology, to reduce the B.C Wine Industry's carbon emissions. An economic model was developed to calculate the value-added for each of the three sectors that comprise the BC Wine industry. Results indicate that each sector of the wine value chain is potentially profitable, with 9,000 tonnes of CO2 sequestered each year. The study is unique in that it demonstrates that using biochar, produced from wine industry waste, to sequester atmospheric CO2 can be both profitable and environmentally sustainable.

We discuss a class of explicitly solvable mean field type control problems/mean field games with a clear economic interpretation. More precisely, we consider long term average impulse control problems with underlying general one-dimensional diffusion processes motivated by optimal harvesting problems in natural resource management. We extend the classical stochastic Faustmann models by allowing the prices to depend on the state of the market using a mean field structure. In a competitive market model, we prove that, under natural conditions, there exists an equilibrium strategy of threshold-type and furthermore characterize the threshold explicitly. If the agents cooperate with each other, we are faced with the mean field type control problem. Using a Lagrange-type argument, we prove that the optimizer of this non-standard impulse control problem is of threshold-type as well and characterize the optimal threshold. Furthermore, we compare the solutions and illustrate the findings in an example.

Decentralization is a centerpiece in Cameroonian's government institutions' design. This chapter elaborates a simple hierarchy model for the analysis of the effects of power devolution. The model predicts overall positive effects of decentralization with larger effects when the local authority processes useful information on how to better allocate the resources. The estimation of the effects of the 2010's power devolution to municipalities in Cameroon suggests a positive impact of decentralization on early human capital accumulation. The value added by decentralization is the same for Anglophone and Francophone municipalities; the effects of decentralization are larger for advanced levels of primary school.

The central idea of the paper is to present a general simple patchwork construction principle for multivariate copulas that create unfavourable VaR (i.e. Value at Risk) scenarios while maintaining given marginal distributions. This is of particular interest for the construction of Internal Models in the insurance industry under Solvency II in the European Union.

We consider a nonlinear random walk which, in each time step, is free to choose its own transition probability within a neighborhood (w.r.t. Wasserstein distance) of the transition probability of a fixed L\'evy process. In analogy to the classical framework we show that, when passing from discrete to continuous time via a scaling limit, this nonlinear random walk gives rise to a nonlinear semigroup. We explicitly compute the generator of this semigroup and corresponding PDE as a perturbation of the generator of the initial L\'evy process.

It has been claimed that a small subset of COVID-19 public stimulus packages is sufficient to meet the short-term energy investment needs to leverage a shift toward a pathway consistent with the 1.5 {\deg}C target of the Paris Agreement. We argue that this short-sighted and public investment-led view misrepresents the grand challenges that climate change mitigation entails.

We investigate how protectionist policies influence short-run economic growth. Our empirical strategy exploits an extraordinary tax scandal that gave rise to an unexpected change of government in Sweden. A free-trade majority in parliament was overturned by a protectionist majority in 1887. The protectionist government increased tariffs. We employ the synthetic control method to select control countries against which economic growth in Sweden can be compared. We do not find evidence suggesting that protectionist policies influenced economic growth and examine channels why. New tariff laws increased government revenue. However, the results do not suggest that the protectionist government stimulated the economy by increasing government expenditure.

We modify the standard model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products, imperfect information, and search frictions by allowing consumers to flexibly acquire information about a product's match value during their visits. We characterize a consumer's optimal search and information acquisition protocol and analyze the pricing game between firms. Notably, we establish that in search markets there are fundamental differences between search frictions and information frictions, which affect market prices, profits, and consumer welfare in markedly different ways. Although higher search costs beget higher prices (and profits for firms), higher information acquisition costs lead to lower prices and may benefit consumers. We discuss implications of our findings for policies concerning disclosure rules and hidden fees.

Statistical significance measures the reliability of a result obtained from a random experiment. We investigate the number of repetitions needed for a statistical result to have a certain significance. In the first step, we consider binomially distributed variables in the example of medication testing with fixed placebo efficacy, asking how many experiments are needed in order to achieve a significance of 95 %. In the next step, we take the probability distribution of the placebo efficacy into account, which to the best of our knowledge has not been done so far. Depending on the specifics, we show that in order to obtain identical significance, it may be necessary to perform twice as many experiments than in a setting where the placebo distribution is neglected. We proceed by considering more general probability distributions and close with comments on some erroneous assumptions on probability distributions which lead, for instance, to a trivial explanation of the fat tail.